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ABSTRACT 
The Federal Photovoltaics Utilization Program (FPU P) was established in 1978 with the belief that getting 
photovoltaic cells into the market was a "bootstrap problem" - one of eliminating market  uncertainties 
through federal procurements to enable investments in improved production processes. A lack of clearly 
defined program objectives and expected results, however, was translated into continuing difficulties in 
implementation.  Using the FPU P experience as an example, an alternative model of photovoltaic procure- 
ment is proposed which is simultaneously more structured (in that greater analytical control is used in 
selecting applications to fund) and more adaptive (in that continuous feedback is built in). A discussion of 
such a framework and sequential evaluation design is followed by some comments  pertaining to the future 
of other commercialization efforts. 
I. Introduct ion 
This paper critically examines the Federal Photovoltaic Utilization Program (FPUP) 
- a 1978 program intended to speed the market penetration of photovoltaic technol- 
ogy through governmental procurements. Its purpose is two-fold: (1) to des'cribe and 
evaluate the structure and conduct  of  the F P U P  Program; and (2) to develop an 
alternative approach to photovoltaic (PV) procurement based upon the actual expe- 
riences of program implementation. 
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The evaluation suggests that a lack of clearly defined legislative objectives translat- 
ed into problems with the intervention strategy and continuing difficulties in imple- 
mentation. The proposed alternative program framework attempts to overcome these 
difficulties; it aims to accomplish simultaneously multiple objectives (e.g., reduce cost, 
stimulate innovation, encourage competition and develop performance data) by 
utilizing a quasi-experimental approach to procurement and building in continuous 
feedback loops from both procuring agencies and contracted industries. The observa- 
tions made about the FPUP experience should be of interest to those concerned with 
policy implementation and to future designers of technology commercialization pro- 
grams. 
Section lI begins by tracing the development of the FPUP Program in the context of 
federal energy policy and describes the program's approach, funding and conduct. 
Section III explores some of the problems encountered during implementation; these 
include the effects of changing social, economic and political environments, and 
problems with the theory of the intervention itself. Section IV proposes an alternative 
approach to program conduct based upon sequential evaluation, which enables the 
program resources to be directed at the potentially most productive applications. 
Section V describes in detail the nature of the alternative framework including a 
discussion of the intervention model, target population, measures of performance and 
the procurement design. The paper concludes (Section VI) with a few thoughts about 
the implications of the FPUP experience for future commercialization program 
design. 
II. The Evolution of FPUP 
In 1970, U.S. domestic oil production peaked and began to decline. In 1974, America 
received its first energy "shock" in the form of an oil embargo imposed by the OPEC 
countries. But despite rising prices and heightened insecurity, dependence on foreign 
oil has almost doubled since the embargo, now accounting for nearly half of U.S. oil 
consumption. 
The two other traditional energy sources coal and nuclear power - suffer from 
similar uncertainties. The development of nuclear power has been mired in controver- 
sy that goes beyond purely technical issues to considerations of personal conviction, 
social equity and political philosophy. Similarly, while the increased use of coal seems 
feasible given America's vast reserves, uncertainties about long-term, global environ- 
mental effects and more immediate problems of labor and management within the 
industry have resulted in a general reluctance to commit heavily to coal [2]. Given this 
climate of political uncertainty and rising costs, many of the non-conventional, 
alternative energy technologies begin to look more attractive. An important cluster of 
such alternative technologies are those broadly described as "solar energy" applica- 
tions. 
With the passage of the Solar Energy Research, Development and Demonstration 
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Act (PL 93-473) in 1974, Congress laid what it intended to be the foundation for a 
billion-dollar federal solar energy program. As an initial step, it approved $75 million 
for a national appraisal of commercially promising solar applications [3]. Among 
those applications designated for further consideration was photovoltaics a system 
for the direct conversion of the sun's rays into electricity. In August, 1976, the Energy 
Conservation and Production Act (PL 94-385) was passed. Section 110 of the Act 
required the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) to "develop the policies, plans, 
implementation strategies, and program definitions for promoting accelerated utiliza- 
tion and widespread commercialization of solar energy." The most notable achieve- 
ment spurred by the Act was the development of a commercialization plan for what 
had come to be regarded as one of the more attractive but difficult solar applications 
photovoltaics [4]. 
In 1977, the Department of Energy (DOE) became interested in increasing federal 
purchases of photovoltaic (PV) arrays and systems. Such an approach assumed that 
getting PV cells into the market was a "bootstrap problem." Elimination of market 
uncertainty through federal procurements would encourage companies to invest in 
improved production technologies that promised lower prices, which, in turn, would 
open up new markets [5]. 
Three laws mandated federal purchases of PV systems. The Department of Energy 
Act of 1978 - Civilian Applications (PL 95-238, Section 208) - made $12 million 
available to purchase PV equipment for federal facilities. A Federal Photovoltaics 
Utilization Program (FPUP) was established by part 4 of the National Energy 
Conservation Policy Act of 1978 (PL 95-619). FPUP was set up as a procurement 
program for three years (FY 1979-81) and authorized at $98 million. Finally, the Solar 
Photovoltaics Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration (RD&D) Act of 
1978 (PL 95-590) established a ten-year, $1.5 billion federal commitment to photovol- 
taics. While this act initially encompassed PV purchases as well as RD&D, President 
Carter, in 1978, recommended against a broad federal purchase program tied to this 
Act because he perceived research and development to be the most pressing priority 
[6]. With the advent of the new administration in January, 1981, most solar commer- 
cialization programs, including procurements, were slated for the chopping block [7]. 
Thus, at least during the Carter years, the Federal Photovoltaic Utilization Program 
(FPUP) constituted the centerpiece of federal PV procurement efforts. 
FPUP was a program under which federal agencies were authorized to procure and 
install PV systems in federal facilities. Congress set forth the major objectives of the 
program to include: 
I. Accelerating the growth of a commercially viable and competitive industry to make 
photovoltaic solar electric systems available to the general public; 
2. Reducing fossil fuel costs to the federal government; 
3. Developing performance data on the program; and 
4. Stimulating the general use, within the federal government, of methods for the 
minimization of life cycle costs. 
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Thus, the legislation (through the acquisition of PV systems by the federal govern- 
ment) sought to facilitate the use of low-cost production techniques by private 
suppliers, thereby fostering price reduction and increased market penetration of PV 
systems. 
Congress authorized $98 million to the DOE to be expended between October 1, 
1978 and September 30, 1981 for the purchase of up to 30 megawatts (MWp) of PV 
systems. Despite the authorization, however, only $25 million was actually appro- 
priated - $15 million in FY 1979 and $I0 million in FY 1980 [8]. The money from the 
first two years was used to fund 2,760 applications within 26 federal agencies. The 
third year was dedicated largely to the processing and filing of agency reports on the 
actual photovoltaic applications, with few additional procurements being funded [9]. 
The Office of Solar Applications within DOE was responsible for overall FPUP 
administration. Technical, cost estimating, and policy supports for the program were 
provided by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's Lead Center [10]. Other key actors in the 
FPUP Program included: 
- Participating Federal Agencies; 
Photovoltaic Manufacturers; and 
- The Program Review Advisory Committee. 
The Program Advisory Committee (required by FPUP legislation) provided program 
oversight and was the entity responsible for recommending modifications to the 
program as deemed appropriate [11]. 
Federal agencies wishing to participate in FPUP were required to submit proposals 
to DOE for implementing their own projects if accepted by DOE. Responsibilities 
included not only the planning and purchasing of the actual equipment but also an 
elaborate system of reporting to DOE on system installation, performance, operation 
and maintenance. 
The FPUP strategy called for five funding cycles over the allotted three year period, 
subject to the availability of funds (see Table 1). Each cycle included: solicitations for 
applications; application selection; transfer of funds; system procurements; installa- 
tion and operation; and monitoring and assessment of system performance. Division 
of the program into such "funding cycles" reflected a recognition of the non-uniformi- 
ty of potential PV markets. 
Intertechnology Corporation [12] identified over 1,000 potential applications of 
photovoltaics. Another analyst [ 13] subdivided major PV markets into three catego- 
ries: Near Term; Intermediate Term; and Long Term. Exemplary applications can be 
grouped according to this organizing principle (Table 2). Generally, Near Term 
applications are small-scale, remote applications that are currently cost-effective 
whereas Long Term applications are those that would have to compete with current 
large, grid-connected applications (e.g., industrial electricity) [14]. 
Although FPUP has now reached the end of its third and final year, it never moved 
significantly beyond the fourth funding cycle as outlined above [15]. While a few 
T A B L E  1 
F P U P  Applicat ion Cycles* 
Fiscal year Cycle Major applications Cost-effective 
1978 1 Small remote Late 1970s 
1979 II Small remote Early 1980s 
1I| Intermediate remote 
1980 IV Intermediate remote 
1981 V Residential 




* From U.S. DOE. 1979. "Federal Photovoltaics Utilization Plan," 
Pasadena: Jet Propulsion Laboratory (October). 
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T A B L E  2 













Village power systems 








Long term market 
Residential electricity 
Utility electrical generation 
Commercial and industrial applications 
* Adapted from Morse et al. (1979). "Commercialization Strategy Report for Photo- 
voltaic Systems." Washington D.C.: DOE; and Posner, David. 1979. "Photovoltaic 
Markets: A Review and Assessment." Golden, CO.: Solar Energy Research Institute. 
larger ,  g r id - in t e rac t ive  sys tems were  funded ,  mos t  app l i ca t i ons  were  sys tems which  
had  n o t  on ly  been  p r o v e n  feas ib le ,  but  had  a lso  been  s h o w n  to  be c u r r e n t l y  cost-e f fec-  
tive. This  p r e o c c u p a t i o n  wi th  cos t -ef fec t iveness ,  in c o n j u n c t i o n  wi th  o the r  a s soc ia ted  
fac to rs ,  has  ra ised  m a n y  ques t i ons  a b o u t  the  ef f icacy  o f  F P U P  in a c h i e v i n g  its s ta ted  
goa l s  [16]. Be fo re  t u r n i n g  to an  a l t e rna t ive  a p p r o a c h  to p r o g r a m  de f in i t ion  and  
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sequential evalutation, a brief discussion of the problems that were encountered by 
FPUP is necessary. 
III .  P r o b l e m s  a n d  U n c e r t a i n t i e s  in  I m p l e m e n t a t i o n  
In 1977, the Solar Energy Research Institute (SERI) conducted a Photovoltaic 
Venture Analysis [17]. This study analyzed a proposed subsidy for private purchases 
of PV systems and concluded that such an approach was not an effective means of 
stimulating system cost reductions. Although there have been other studies focusing 
on the potential federal market for photovoltaics [ 18] beyond the work at SERI, little 
effort has been devoted to examining the impacts of federal purchase programs on the 
industrial and market development of photovoltaics. 
Thus, while many purchasing programs have been proposed and one (FPUP) was 
carried out, a clear statement of the objectives and expectedresults of federal purchas- 
ing programs was not articulated [19]. Such ambiguity stemmed largely from the fact 
that the procurement model engendered in the FPUP program (and other proposals) 
was largely the brainchild of an overly ambitious Congress [20]. Indeed, FPUP's 
legislative history suggests that Congress was attempting to push a lethargic DOE into 
a more active stance regarding small-scale PV commercialization and use [21]. The 
resultant lack of clear objectives and a defined strategy was translated into continuing 
difficulties in interpretation and implementation which culminated in no appropria- 
tions for the third and final year. These difficulties and uncertainties can be grouped 
into three categories: changes in the environment during the intervention; difficulties 
arising directly from implementation; and problems associated with the theoo, of the 
intervention. 
Changing Environmental Context 
A diverse and evolving social, economic and political environment might have com- 
bined to alter or otherwise obfuscate the intention or effects of federal PV purchases. 
Areas of uncertainity include: 
- Relative scarcity and costs of fossil fuels: 
- Trends in the economy, especially inflation and interest rates; 
Status of competing electrical generation technologies; 
- Trends in popular sentiment concerning conventional electrical sources; 
The ultimate size of the foreign market [22]; and 
- The rate of technological innovation in the photovoltaics industry [23]. 
Difficulties Arising During Implementation 
Several problems arose in attempting to implement FPUP as passed by Congress. 
Difficulties included: 
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Lack of specific criteria for determining which firms shall receive contracts. By 
allowing agencies to procure their own equipment, DOE effectively lost all control 
over which firms were given federal contracts and what size and form such con- 
tracts should take. 
Problems in specifying criteria for choosing which photovoltaic applications 
should be the focus of the program. 
- Withheld appropriations. In its first two years, the FPUP Program received $25 
million of the initial $98 million appropriation and no funding in its third year. 
Trade-offs with other programs. President Carter's statement recommending 
against a commercialization effort tied to the Solar Photovoltaic Energy RD&D 
Act of 1978 set the stage for a greatly increased RD&D at the expense of commer- 
cialization efforts [24]. Other trade-offs included conflicts with other electricity-gen- 
eration programs, especially those related to the large, centralized solar-electric 
systems. 
Problems with the Theory of Intervention 
Many analogies have been made concerning the role that the federal government 
could play in PV technology and the role that the government played in the develop- 
ment of semiconductor technology in the 1950 and 1960s [25]. Indeed, substantial 
evidence exists to conclude that procurements were an effective means of encouraging 
integrated circuit and transistor technological advances and industrial development 
[26]. 
One SERI study [27], however, noted that early military procurements of semicon- 
ductors differed from PV procurements in the emphasis placed on technical achieve- 
ment versus price reduction: 
A distinguishing characteristic of Department of Defense purchase of semiconductors was their empha- 
sis on performance, reliability and design requirements. DOD was willing to purchase innovative 
products at premium prices. When lower prices become the objective of government photovoltaic 
procurements, the stimulus provided by an early federal market that is more profitable and accessible 
than private markets is reduced. The introduction of cost reduction as the major objective of photovolta- 
ic procurements is likely to change the influences that these procurements have on industry development 
[28]. 
Thus, the situation was no longer as simple as the early days of the transistor when the 
government was willing to pay high prices for technology that worked. As a result, the 
relationship between federal PV purchases and system cost reductions was unclear. 
Another area of confusion and uncertainty regarding the theory of the program 
concerned the extent to which the FPUP Program could contribute to reaching DOE 
price goals for PV applications (see Table 3). 
Beyond the fact that these price goals were set somewhat arbitrarily in 1973 during 
the crash "Project Independence" [29] and must therefore be of at least questionable 
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TABLE3 
DOE Photovoltaic ModulePrice  Goals* 





* Adapted from Fan, John (1978). "Solar cells: Plugging 
into the Sun," Technology Review (Aug./Sept.); and 
U.S. DOE (1979). "Federal Photovoltaic Utilization 
Program Plan." Pasadena: Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 
validity, it has been stated that such cost reductions would require investment (in 
automated production lines with corresponding market volumes) of 100 MWp/year  
[30]. The systems volume associated with FPUP for the full $98 million would only 
have totalled 7.5 MWp despite Congressional authorization of 30 MWp [31]. Thus, 
FPUP alone was clearly not capable of creating a competitive industry capable of 
selling cost-effective PV systems. Furthermore, by focusing primarily on the reduction 
of PV module costs, the FPUP Program ignored important facets of the production 
process. Indeed, the DOE's FPUP Environmental Assesment estimated that only 45% 
of PV system costs are accounted for by modules; the remaining 55% includes what is 
known as"balance of system" cost (e.g., power conditioners, storage capacity, structu- 
ral supports, and other infrastructure) [32]. Despite DOE's efforts to encourage 
agencies to procure entire systems from single suppliers, the law's focus on module 
cost reduction inhibited system-wide considerations. 
Another key determinant of future PV prices outside the realm of the FPUP 
Program was the availability and cost of the basic raw material. FPUP dealt exclusive- 
ly with single crystal silicon solar cell applications. Because the PV industry uses less 
than 1% of the national silicon production, PV manufacturers are usually the last 
customers to be served by suppliers; and as demand increases, the result is higher 
prices [33]. Such price increases are due not to an absolute scarcity of silicon (which is 
the most abundant element on earth) but to inadequate capacity to produce the highly 
refined and energy-intensive semiconductor grade silicon needed for PV cell produc- 
tion [34]. Thus, by structuring the procurement program on the basis of a predefined 
declining price schedule, FPUP may have tried to encourage price competition and 
reduction that was not based on the real costs of production. 
IV. Toward an Alternative Approach 
There was great potential in the FPUP Program for mid-course correction and 
learning. Since the program was authorized for FY 1979-81, a sequential evaluation of 
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the program as it was implemented could have conceivably resulted in the restructur- 
ing of the approach for FY 1980 and 1981 and produced knowledge and information 
useful to future commercialization and procurement efforts. Such an approach to 
evaluation might be viewed as an iterative, flexible mechanism intended to direct the 
energy of the program to the most potentially productive applications. The overall 
goal of such an approach, therefore, would have been to structure a framework for 
evaluating the effects of federal PV purchases on industry using a collaborative 
approach involving DOE administrators, program staff, and representatives from the 
industry. By assuming an open, non-threatening posture toward the evaluation effort, 
the possibilities for mutual learning among all parties involved would have been 
greatly enhanced. While the current administration is basically averse to such direct 
intervention in the market place, it is at least feasible that a more analytically sound 
and economically effective model of solar commercialization would have fared better 
in funding levels. Specific objectives associated with the above approach would 
include a knowledge of: 
- What would have happened without FPUP? That is, the establishment of a frame- 
work andprocess for determining the effects of the purchases made under FPUP on 
the PV industry to the one already established for monitoring and assessing the 
use of the PV systems by purchasing federal agencies. 
- What are the alternative ways the FPUP money could be spent? Given the four 
major objectives contained in the legislation (see p. 327), what are the alternative 
methods of expenditures to achieving these goals? 
- Which methods of procurement are most successful? Out of the various methods 
available for expenditure of FPUP funds, which are the most effective at achieving 
their intended objectives and what is their optimal mix? 
- What approaches should be considered in the future? Based on the FPUP expe- 
rience, a great deal of knowledge about procurement should be generalizable to 
other commercialization efforts. 
V. S truc tur ing  a Learn ing  F r a m e w o r k  
Before describing the alternative approach in more detail, it is necessary to come to 
grips with some basic questions about the nature of the procurement program. These 
include specification of the intervention model, the target population, the measures of 
performance, and the assessment framework. 
The Intervention Model 
FPUP,  as stated previously, differed markedly in its approach to technological change 
from most other RD&D federal programs. Rather than focusing on the technical 
aspects of the device itself, this intervention model sought to manipulate the market 
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for the device. The various hypotheses contained in this model might be summarized 
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The Target Population 
FPUP contained three levels of targets - federal agencies, private photovoltaic pro- 
ducers, and the "general public." In this context, it is important to distinguish between 
immediate targets and eventual targets. More specifically, the purchase of PV equip- 
ment by federal agencies from specific private firms was viewed as only a short-term 
objective intended to foster a longer term objective of making PV systems available to 
the public through enhanced industry competition and lowered market prices. Inher- 
ent in a purchase plan approach was a complex system of interactions entailing the 
transformation (or at least modification) of the entire electrical energy system, thus 
implying a diffusion process of broad and complex interactions [35]. 
Given the central importance of the PV industry in such a program, it might better 
be labelled an assistance effort rather than aprocurement effort. But since the existing 
market for electricity is by no means uniform (e.g., dry cells versus electric generators), 
the task of specifying precisely the industry target group is difficult; only public 
utilities were specifically excluded from such efforts by the legislation. What was 
required is a more explicit statement of the specific firms or classes of firms being 
addressed by such a program. 
Measures of Performance 
Pertinent data to be collected for implementing the alternative approach can be 
usefully displayed according to variable type (Table 4). 
The validity of these measures would appear to be quite high given the many 
complementary pieces of information about both firms and purchases. While reliabili- 
tyof  the measures would not seem to be a problem for the independent variables (since 
they are all matters of public information), the dependent variables may suffer from 
reliability problems given the sensitive (and possibly proprietary) nature of the infor- 
mation being requested. 
TABLE 4 
Data According to Variable Type 
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Independent variables Dependent variables 
a) Characteristics of firm a) Price of equipment 
size (No. of employees) (application) 
differentiation unit prices 
growth rate $ per peak watt (Wp) 






b) Characteristics of purchase b) Sale of equipment 
contract type ' (application) 
contract size sales volume 
absolute sales receipts 
relative to company sales market composition 
contract duration 
The Assessment Framework 
We must be very leary of drawing causal links between immediate federal actions and 
distant societal changes. Indeed, the most socially meaningful connections are always 
the most difficult to measure and substantiate. Even the more direct influence of 
federal purchases on the PV industry per se must be subjected to close scrutiny since 
there are many other confounding and competing factors which might account for any 
apparent positive effect induced by the program. The problems associated with such 
"competing explanations of outcome" might be presented schematically as follows 
(see Fig. 1). 
Let us examine these competing explanations a little more closely. 
Competing Explanations. The critical evaluation issue is whether or not a program 
has produced more of an effect than would have occurred either without intervention 
or compared with alternative interventions [36]. In a sense, alternative explanations 
"compete" with the intervention as causes of the outcome. There are several factors 
which might have influenced the rate of commercialization of photovoltaics other 
than a procurement program. These include: 
Long-term social trends: As society becomes aware of the problems inherent in the 
continued use of non-renewable energy resources and the dependence on foreign 
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Fig. 1. Schematic of program causal links. 
technologies. This might be coupled with a more general trend toward decentral ism- a 
social vision which fits very well with small-scale on-site solar applications. Further, as 
electric utility companies experience increasing difficulties in the siting of large power 
plants, and costs rise accordingly, the trend may shift from one of centralized electrical 
production to decentralized service using PV as the principle technology. 
S h o r t - t e r m  in t e rven ing  events:  Several forces at large in society may have the effect 
of obscuring ~he effectiveness of the procurement program in accomplishing its 
objectives (not to mention yet unforeseen variables). Examples of general phenomena 
include: 
- Overall economic trends; 
- Costs of fossil fuels; 
- Status of competing electrical generation alternatives (e.g., wind, biomass); 
- Technological and cost breakthroughs in PVs (e.g., silicon production). 
Examples of specific competing governmental programs include: 
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The Federal Photovoltaic Energy RD&D Act (1978); 
- The Experimental Technology Incentives Program (ETIP) [37]; 
- Residential and business tax credits (i.e., the National Energy Act); 
Utility regulations for peak load and declining block rate price reforms; 
- Regulations and taxes discouraging oil and gas use; 
- Federal loan guarantee programs. 
Selection bias effects: The choice among many PV producers for purchases may 
have a profound effect on the ultimate outcome of the program. The mix of large, 
established producers with smaller entrepreneurial firms is an important variable in 
meeting the stated goals ofa"commercial ly  viable and competitive" industry. Provid- 
ing strong financial incentives (in the form of purchase orders) to the most innovative 
or successful producers could stratify the industry into a handful of strong competitors 
and a myriad of marginal operations. This may be neither economically efficient nor 
socially desirable since a more "natural" development of the industry might lead to 
enhanced capabilities through competition. It is therefore critically important to 
consider not only which firms receive procurement contracts, but also the nature (i.e., 
size, duration) of the contracts themselves. Equally important is the need to monitor 
those firms who choose either not to bid for contracts or whose bids are rejected since 
the ability to secure a procurement contract may be influenced by factors other than 
potential production or innovation capabilities (e.g., company aggressiveness, propo- 
sal preparation capabilities). 
Unreliability effects: The collection of reliable information from the PV producers 
may hold significant problems. As firms embark on innovative production courses, 
they may be unwilling to divulge fully their plans. Similarly, sales volume or informa- 
tion about growth and profits may be masked, making evaluation of industry changes 
very difficult. Further, the extent of unreliability of reporting may vary over the course 
of the program depending on the immediate business situation. 
Evaluation-related effects: The mere act of monitoring and evaluating the perfor- 
mance of selected firms may result in sufficient notoriety to cause a significant 
disruption in the outcome. This "Hawthorne Effect" is by far the most difficult 
extraneous variable to treat. 
The Evaluation Design. In an effort to isolate the effects of the procurement program 
from the competing explanations outlined above, a mixed strategy of non-randomized 
experiments with constructed controls in combination with before and after measures 
(reflexive controls) is recommended. Such a mixed approach seems appropriate since: 
- the target population of firms is only slightly larger than covered by the program; 
- the program has yet to be completely implemented, thus there exists sufficient 
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"unexposed" targets (i.e., firms which have not received federal purchase con- 
tracts); 
- time-series data on the industry should be relatively easy to accumulate; and 
- given the multiple objectives and contract arrangements under the program, no 
single assessment methodology could embrace all desired program outcomes. 
The first step is to develop a framework within which the various PV companies and 
contracting arrangements can be categorized (Fig. 2). The number of current and 
potential producers contained in the Fig. would not include all companies. Rather, the 
numbers in the Fig. would reflect only those firms (approximately 13-15) involved in 
some form of single crystal silicon PV R&D or production; materials suppliers are 
excluded. 
The next step is to collect time-series data (1970 present) on equipment sales and 
unit prices for individual producers and the industry as a whole. Such time-series 
information allows before and after comparisons of both individual firms (reflexive 
control) and the entire industry as well as providing the data necessary for the 
matching of similar companies to compare the effects of purchases (constructed 
controls). Such comparisons will enable the effects of "long-term social trends" and 
"short-term interventing events" to be isolated effectively following the intervention 
(i.e., the actual purchases). 
Different contracting approaches could then be used to test the viability of the 
various objectives associated with the procurement program [38]. Large, multi-year, 
fixed-price contracts that specify progressively lower module prices could reduce the 
market uncertainties faced by participating companies and stimulate production 
investments leading to cost reductions. Companies with access to substantial capital 



























Fig. 2. Design framework. 
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the program seeks to foster a competitive industry and because it has been estimated 
that a purchase of at least $15 million would be required to spur such investment [39], 
it is appropriate that only one such contract be made. The award could be made 
through a sealed bid approach with the potential for rapid market penetration being 
the major award criterion. Since only one such contract would be let, a"control"  firm 
could be selected out of the pool of unsuccessful bidders based on a matching of 
important organizational characteristics (e.g., size, ownership, budget, growth rate, 
etc.) for the purposes of paired comparison. Although a number of intangible organi- 
zational characteristics are ignored when using such formal criteria, such a paired 
comparison would nonetheless offer an indication of the effects attributable to the 
large purchase. 
Small, cost-based purchases could encourage many different companies to gain 
experience with a wide variety of PV systems [40]. Because of their small size and short 
duration, contracts for single applications would probably not stimulate industry 
production investments; such purchases would, however, provide valuable informa- 
tion to both suppliers and potential users on the performance of photovoltaic systems. 
Such a "stratified" method would ensure that all classes of firms would receive 
procurement contracts under the program and would help to mitigate the "selection 
bias" problem associated with the large multi-year contracts. Since the major purpose 
of such diverse purchases is to develop production experience and performance data 
on specific, promising PV systems, sales of contracted systems types could be moni- 
tored to see if any discernable increase is detected following the federal purchases. 
Procurement of new module or system concepts using innovative production tech- 
niques might be a desirable component since significant cost reductions do not result 
from merely expanding existing production capabilities; what is required are produc- 
tion improvements to complete key production steps faster and at a lower cost [41]. 
Criteria for awards should be system performance and potential for large price 
declines; initial cost-effectiveness would not be of critical concern. Prices of those 
products procured could be monitored and compared with the prices of comparable 
products using traditional production methods. A simple before and after analysis 
could then be made of the prices of the equipment. Since both the innovative products 
and the "traditional" comparison product would be exposed to the same extraneous 
influences, most of the "competing explanations" would be controlled for except 
selection bias. The different contract types and their respective features are summar- 
ized in Table 5. To further minimize the "selection bias" problem, it may be also 
advisable to examine both those firms deciding not to become involved in the pro- 
gram, and those firms which submitted bids which were rejected. Examination of 
company leadership, organization, and skills may lead to some insights about what 
factors contribute to a firm's ability or inability to secure federal contracts. 
Following all the federal purchases, information on unit prices and equipment sales 
should continue to be collected for a period of 1-2 years. Of particular interest should 
be who buys the equipment (above and beyond sheer sales volume). A changing mix of 
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TABLE 5 
Summary of Evaluation Design 
Contract Contract type 
features 
Large, multi-year Innovative product Small, 
purchase (fixed purchase cost-based 
cost) purchase 
Purpose Stimulate production Accelerate growth Accelerate 
expansion: reduce of diverse and growth of 
uncertainity; l ower  competitive in- diverse 
unit costs for dustry; stimulate and competi- 
modules investment in tive industry; 
innovative methods develop per- 
formance data 
on a variety of 
systems; market 
information 
Criteria Well defined, cur- Performance, r e l i -  Performance, 
for rently marketable ability and poten- reliability 
award  applications tial for large and potential for 
(cost-effective- price declines wide application 
ness) in the near and 
immediate term 
Selection Sealed bids Active sol ici ta-  "Stratified" 
method tion: proposal competit ive bids 
submission 
Analytic Constructed Be fo re -and -a f t e r  Reflexive 
control control analysis control - 
paired corn- system specific 
parison 
purchasers in con junc t ion  with increasing sales volume might suggest penet ra t ion  of 
new markets.  A s t rong t rend of this sort among  firms receiving federal p rocurement  
contracts  might  lead to connect ions  between federal purchase and later market  
penet ra t ion  and expansion.  Such a connec t ion  would const i tute the critical l ink 
between federal in te rvent ion  and concomi tan t  changes in the behavior  of society at 
large. 
VI. Conclus ions  
While the overall goal of the Fcdcral  Photovoltaics  Uti l izat ion P rogram ( F P U P )  was 
clear, it suffered f rom a lack of clearly defined objectives and  expected results; there 
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was no meaningful connection between individual procurement decisions and the 
"success" of the program from the standpoint of system cost reduction or market 
penetration. Indeed, most funded applications were systems which had not only been 
proven feasible, but also had been shown to be currently cost-effective. DOE's 
preoccupation with existing technology and current cost-effectiveness was in direct 
conflict with the goal of stimulating the technical and commercial viability of the PV 
industry. Further, by focusing primarily on reducing module costs, the program tried 
to encourage price competition and reductions that were not based on the real costs of 
production. 
Despite the current political climate, it is nonetheless possible to learn a great deal 
from the FPUP experience. As suggested, DOE could have assumed more control over 
the procurement strategies to be used and the companies to be contracted by incorpo- 
rating aspects of quasi-experimentation and sequential evaluation into its program 
design. This would have allowed the possibility for feedback and mid-course correc- 
tion, thereby keeping the energy of the program directed at the most productive mix of 
applications. A more collaborative approach to program design and evaluation could 
have also greatly enhanced the efficacy of the program. By involving DOE administra- 
tors and staff as well as representatives from industry, the program could have been 
better assured of identifying and targeting the key variables and linkages involved in 
PV commercialization. By reducing the perceived threat associated with such efforts 
through early involvement and continuous feedback, program implementation (and 
evaluation) could move from a one-time, often post hoc pronouncement of success or 
failure, to an ongoing systematic learning effort. 
Finally, the observations and suggestions made in this article about the FPUP 
Program can be readily generalized to numerous other federal programs intended to 
speed the market penetration of emerging of rapidly developing technologies. For 
example, the bulk of the solar commercialization programs of the 1970s were plagued 
by many of the same problems of the FPUP Program. Most important among these 
problems was the over-concentration on currently available and cost-effective tech- 
nology. Failing to recognize the dynamic nature of emerging technologies, such 
programs were largely unsuccessful at stimulating industry in the ways needed to 
speed effectively both the development and penetration of the technologies. 
Federal procurement programs can facilitate the development of new technologies 
by providing an early market that is more profitable and accessible than private 
markets; when procurements are focussed on cost-effectiveness or price-reduction, 
however, the stimulus for experimentation and innovation is greatly reduced. It can 
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